Discussion: Culture Peers Review 1

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provide your response to the following:

One area that Systems Safety really doesn’t delve into much is that of corporate culture. The Management Oversight Risk Tree Analysis (MORT) can be used to discuss some of the areas where management may have failed but nothing really covers the culture of the company or organization. As we saw in the Challenger crash, the culture of pushing the launch even though multiple engineers said they should delay was a huge factor in why the explosion happened. In the end of the video on the Columbia crash (starting at 43:40 in the video), they discuss the culture at NASA and the fact that they knew a piece of foam had hit the wing and shattered on takeoff but didn’t give it a second thought. The reason for that is because if a long investigation came from it, the next launch might be delayed. NASA was being pushed by Congress to finish the space station and they did not want a delay.

So, for this week’s discussion there are two questions:

1. How did the culture at NASA contribute to both of these crashes?
2. Had the culture at NASA changed in the 17 years since the crash of the Challenger or was it just business as usual and they had just been “lucky”?

 

Classmate post that you need to post comment/ review on:

1. How did the culture at NASA contribute to both of these crashes?

         The overall culture at NASA is similar to any other business out there. Sure they may not be a for profit corporation, but they answer to congress who themselves have agendas. In 1986, the engineering team voiced their concerns that the sub-zero temperatures would compromise the integrity of the O-Rings but management decided to proceed with the launch anyways resulting in the deaths of the crew and total loss of the space shuttle. The Columbia’s destruction was a result of damage to the shuttle’s thermal exterior and was also brushed off by management when voiced up by the engineering team. The common trend in both of these crashes is definitely management placing the overall mission over safety because they were being pressured by congress to continue launches.

  2.Had the culture at NASA changed in the 17 years since the crash of the Challenger or was it just business as usual and they had just been “lucky”?

        If I were to describe the culture at NASA during its 17 year disaster free period I would have the reader picture a mountain. Prior to the Challenger’s destruction would be considered the base of the mountain and the years following its destruction would be the top of the mountain. The depiction from the base of the mountain to the top would be NASA’s reactive safety culture following the disaster. Following any major aviation disaster, it is normal for companies to scramble and develop new policies to ensure the public, and more importantly the shareholders that safety is important so another disaster can be prevented. As the years go by and there are no further disasters the company begins to feel comfortable and even become complacent and they find themselves at the other base of the mountain, which is where the Columbia’s disaster happens and the mountain model starts all over again.